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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Does the First Amendment forbid Vermont from
giving physicians the freedom to keep their private
medical practice information confidential?

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
IDENTITY OF AMICI CURIAE ..........................

1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT......................

2

ARGUMENT ........................................................

4

I. THE VERMONT STATUTE EMPOWERS
PHYSICIANS TO PROTECT MEDICAL
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY ........

4

A. Data Mining Invades Medical Privacy
and Confidentiality................................

5

B. The Prescription Confidentiality Law
Fits Within The Established Framework Of State and Federal Privacy
And Confidentiality Laws ..................... 10
C. Consent For Limited Purposes Does
Not Justify Commercial Data Mining .. 20
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT MISTAKENLY
TREATED THE PRESCRIPTION CONFIDENTIALITY LAW AS AN UNLAWFUL
RESTRICTION ON SPEECH ..................... 24
A. Vermont
Does
Not
Ban
Drug
Advertising ............................................ 24
B. The Vermont Law – As Amended –
Does Not Interfere With The “Marketplace of Ideas” ........................................ 26
C. Medical Privacy Is A Substantial State
Interest .................................................. 30
D. The Prescription Confidentiality Law
“Directly Advances” Substantial State
Interests ................................................. 32

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued
Page
1. Data Mining Increases Costs ...........

34

2. Data Mining Promotes Unsafe
Drugs ................................................ 35
3. Section 17 Gives Vermont Physicians The Freedom To Opt Out Of
Data Mining ..................................... 37
E. Vermont Left This Complex Medical
Decision In The Hands Of The
Treating Physician ................................ 39
CONCLUSION .......................................................

42

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S.
484 (1996) ................................................................24
Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d 573 (D.C. Cir.
2007) ..................................................................13, 15
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980) ........................................................... 25, 30, 31
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) .......13
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1990)......................25
IMS Health Corp. v. Rowe, 532 F.Supp.2d 153
(D. Me. 2008) ...........................................................31
IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2864
(2009) ....................................................... 6, 31, 33, 39
IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 2010 WL 4723183
(2d Cir. 2010)................................................... passim
IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 F.Supp.2d 434
(D. Vt. 2009) ............................................................37
In re Gabapentin Patent Litigation, 312
F.Supp.2d 653 (D.N.J., 2004) .................................12
In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470
(6th Cir. 1983) .........................................................15
Jerome Stevens Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Food
& Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir.
2005) ........................................................................12

v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
525 (2001) .............................................. 14, 15, 24, 25
Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin. v. Nelson,
131 S. Ct. 746 (2011) ...............................................10
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) .......10
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357
(2002) .......................................................................24
Trans Union Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 245
F.3d 809 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ..................................30, 32
Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998) ...........15
Va. State Board of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).................25
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) .........................7, 8
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) ...................10
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
First Amendment ............................................... passim
Fourteenth Amendment .............................................25
STATUTES AND RULES
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C § 101, et seq. .......................12
Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793 ..................................13
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et
seq. ...........................................................................32

vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Intelligence Identities Protection Act, 50
U.S.C. § 421 .............................................................13
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051, et seq. .......................13
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 ...........................................13
Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2710.......................................................................14
2008 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 89, § 3 .........................27
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191.......................... 5, 33
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act,
Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) ...............5
Vermont Patient Privilege Statute, Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 12, § 1612 ..................................................17
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1612(a) ..................................22
Vermont Patient Bill of Rights, Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 18, § 1852(7) ......................................................17
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 1852(a)(7) ..............................22
Vermont Prescription Confidentiality Law,
2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 80, § 17
(2007) ................................................. 4, 15, 22, 28, 30
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4631(d)...............................23
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4631(e) ...............................23
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4631(e)(5)-(6) .....................22
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4631(f) .........................27, 29
Vermont Nursing Home Bill of Rights, Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 33, § 7301 ..................................................17

vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
FEDERAL REGULATIONS:
45 C.F.R. § 160.101 .......................................................5
45 C.F.R. § 164.102 .......................................................5
OTHER AUTHORITIES:
Aaron S. Kesselheim, et al., The Rise and Fall
of Natrecor for Congestive Heart Failure:
Implications for Drug Policy, 25 Health Affairs 1095 (2006) .....................................................37
Aaron S. Kesselheim & David Studdert, Whistleblower-Initiated
Enforcement
Actions
Against Health Care Fraud and Abuse in the
United States, 1996 to 2005, 149 Annals Int.
Med. 342 (2008) .......................................................35
Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, The Role
of Litigation in Defining Drug Risks, 297
JAMA 308 (2007) .....................................................36
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Prior Restraints
and Intellectual Property: The Clash Between
Intellectual Property and the First Amendment from an Economic Perspective, 12
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1, 5
(2001) .......................................................................12
Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?,
283 JAMA 373 (2000) ..............................................34

viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
C. Seth Landefeld & Michael A. Steinman, The
Neurontin Legacy – Marketing Through Misinformation, 360 New Eng. J. Med. 103
(2009) .......................................................................36
Chad Terhune, They Know What’s In Your
Medicine Cabinet, Business Week, July 23,
2008, available at http://www.businessweek.
com/magazine/content/08_31/b4094000643943.
htm ............................................................................9
Charles Ornstein, Ex-Worker Indicted in Celebrity Patient Leaks Former Employee of UCLA
Medical Center is Accused of Selling Data to
the Media, L.A. Times, April 30, 2008 ....................19
CVS Privacy Practices Need Investigation
Despite FTC Order, Pharmacist Group Says,
18 Health L. Rep. 397 (BNA) (March 2009) ...........20
Cynthia Jackevicius, et al., Use of Ezetimibe in
the United States and Canada, 358 New
Eng. J. Med. 1819 (2008) ........................................37
Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and
the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 Hastings
L.J. 1227, 1260 (2003) .............................................37
Eric G. Campbell, et al., A National Survey of
Physician-Industry Relationships, 356 New
Eng. J. Med. 1742 (2007) ........................................35
Eric J. Topol, Nesiritide – Not Verified, 353
New Eng. J. Med. 113 (2005) ..................................37
Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual
Integrity, 79 Wash. L. Rev. 119, 129 (2004) ...........11

ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Jonathan D. Rockoff & Brent Kendall, Pfizer to
Plead Guilty to Improper Marketing, Wall St.
J., Sept. 3, 2009 .......................................................35
Joyce E. Cutler, Kaiser Permanente Gets
$187,000 Fine For Second Patient Privacy
Violation, 18 Health L. Rep. 974 (BNA) (July
2009) ........................................................................20
Katia Campo, et al., Physicians’ Decision
Process for Drug Prescription and the Impact
of Pharmaceutical Marketing Mix Instruments, 22 Health Market. Quarterly 73
(2005) .......................................................................34
Mary Anne Pazanowski, HHS Breaks New
Ground With $43 Million Penalty for HIPAA
Privacy Rule Violation, 20 Health Law Reporter 277 (BNA) (Feb. 24, 2011) ...........................19
Michael A. Steinman, et al., Characteristics
and Impact of Drug Detailing for Gabapentin, 4 PLoS Med. 743 (2007) ...................................34
Michael A. Steinman, et al., Narrative Review:
The Promotion of Gabapentin: An Analysis of
Internal Industry Documents, 145 Annals
Int. Med. 284, 287, Table 2 (2006) ..........................36
Michelle M. Mello, et al., Shifting Terrain in
the Regulation of Off-Label Promotion of
Pharmaceuticals, 360 New Eng. J. Med.
1557, 1562-63, Table 2 (2009) ...........................35, 36

x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Neal M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s
Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 Geo. L.J. 123, 180-81 (2007) ............11
Nicole Lurie, et al., Pharmaceutical Representatives in Academic Medical Centers, 5 J. Gen.
Internal Med. 240 (1990) ........................................34
Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy:
Responding to the Surprising Failures of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1701, 1716
(2010)...................................................................... 8
Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth Honka, The
Effects and Role of Direct-to-Physician Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An
Integrative Review, 5 Yale J. Health Policy,
Law & Ethics 785 (2005) ........................................34
Ray Moynihan, et al., Selling Sickness: The
Pharmaceutical Industry and Disease Mongering, 324 BMJ 886 (2002) ....................................34
Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S. Car. L. Rev. 737
(2007) .......................................................................13
Resolution Agreement, February 14, 2011,
available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/
hipaa/enforcement/examples/massgeneralra.
pdf ............................................................................19
Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and
the First Amendment: The Dangers of First
Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 Stan. L. Rev.
1003, 1006 (2000) ....................................................13

xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What
Privacy Advocates Can Learn from Trade
Secret Law, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 667, 698
(2006) ....................................................................... 11
Sharona Hoffman, Employing E-Health, 19
Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 409 (2010) ............................9
The Prescription Project, Prescription Data Mining, at 3 (Nov. 19, 2009), available at http://
www.prescriptionproject.org/tools/initiatives_
factsheets/files/0004.pdf ......................................38

1
IDENTITY OF AMICI CURIAE1
The New England Journal of Medicine
(NEJM) is the oldest continuously published medical
journal in the world, and has published numerous
scholarly articles on, among other things, advances in
drug therapy, prescription drug side effects, and the
role of the United States Food and Drug Administration and the pharmaceutical industry in our health
care system.
The Massachusetts Medical Society, with
some 22,000 physician and student members, is
dedicated to educating and advocating for the patients and physicians of Massachusetts. We publish
the New England Journal of Medicine, a leading
global medical journal and web site, and Journal
Watch alerts and newsletters covering 13 specialties.
We are also a leader in continuing medical education
for health care professionals throughout Massachusetts, conducting a variety of medical education
programs for physicians and health care professionals. Founded in 1781, we are the oldest continuously
operating medical society in the country.

1

This brief is submitted with the consent of the parties, as
lodged with the Clerk per the Docket Sheets. Pursuant to Rule
37.6, counsel represent that this brief was not authored in whole
or in part by counsel for any party. All expenses of amici have
been borne by their own resources, without support from any
party.

2
The National Physicians Alliance (NPA) is a
membership organization of physicians across specialties throughout the United States who seek to
restore physicians’ primary emphasis on the core
values of our profession: service, integrity, and advocacy for our patients. We work to improve health and
well being, and to ensure equitable, affordable, high
quality health care for all people.
The American Medical Student Association
(AMSA) is the oldest and largest independent association of physicians-in-training in the United States,
with more than 33,000 members. Founded in 1950,
AMSA is a student-governed, nonprofit organization
representing the concerns of physicians-in-training.
AMSA advocates for evidence-based rather than
marketing-based prescribing practices, the removal of
conflicts of interest, and global access to essential
medicines.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
As amended, the Prescription Confidentiality
Law does not include any state-sponsored intrusion
into the “marketplace of ideas.” Vermont does not ban
data mining or drug advertising, but leaves the data
mining decision in the hands of the prescribing
physician. The only state action here is to empower
Vermont physicians with the freedom to choose
privacy.

3
Most Vermont physicians have not chosen to
embrace data mining. Data mining offends the privacy of the physician and also permits companies to
identify particular patients and communities without
consent. In addition to the privacy concerns, these
practices are dangerous and raise health care costs.
The Prescription Confidentiality Law is part of a
larger statutory framework of state and federal laws
protecting medical privacy. Federal law has carved
out a special role for more stringent state medical
privacy laws, protecting them from federal preemption. The First Amendment is also not a defense to
violations of copyright, trade secrecy, and privacy
laws.
Nor does the First Amendment require this Court
to overturn the legislative determination by the
elected government of Vermont, especially when the
state has extensive experience as a health care payor
and has left the ultimate decision to the physician.
The Amici Curiae are leading organizations
representing and educating physicians and medical
students. We have followed these issues carefully for
a number of years. We urge this Court to agree with
Vermont, and leave the data mining decision to the
physicians.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

4
ARGUMENT
I.

THE VERMONT STATUTE EMPOWERS
PHYSICIANS TO PROTECT MEDICAL
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY

As the oldest continuously published medical
journal in the world, amicus THE NEW ENGLAND
JOURNAL OF MEDICINE is directly interested in commercial speech issues involving medicine. The amici
file this brief with no pecuniary interest in the outcome, but with a deep respect for the privacy and
confidentiality of the doctor-patient relationship. The
Vermont Prescription Confidentiality Law, 2007 Vt.
Acts & Resolves No. 80, § 17 (2007) (“Prescription
Confidentiality Law” or “Section 17”), protects those
vital interests without offending the First Amend2
ment. App.129a-140a.
The Respondents assert the novel claim that
private companies can use and sell private health
information, violating state law, without the consent
of any of the individuals involved. This case isn’t
fundamentally an issue of commercial speech; our
view as medical publishers, physicians and medical
students is that data miners have wrongfully converted private health information for commercial
purposes without consent. Data miners should not
2

References to “App._a” are to the appendix filed with the
certiorari petition; “JA_” are to the Joint Appendix filed with the
Pet. Brief; and to “A-_” are to the appendix filed in the Second
Circuit.
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have a First Amendment right to use or sell private
health information. Put another way, intent to publish is not a defense to violation of medical privacy
laws.
A. Data Mining Invades Medical Privacy
and Confidentiality
The clinical encounter between physicians and
their patients is the core relationship in medicine.
Our laws have long recognized that the patient visit
also creates private health information, often of an
intimate nature. See the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No.
104-191 (defining federal health privacy rights); 45
C.F.R. § 160.101, et seq.; 45 C.F.R. § 164.102, et seq.
(HIPAA Privacy Rule), and the recently enacted
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA),
Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (protecting
individual genetic information). Few of us would
want our medical records released to the public or
sold for commercial exploitation without our consent.
Respondents do not deny that prescriberidentifiable medical records lay bare the intimate
details of physicians’ prescribing patterns for their
patients. Brief for Respondent Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, On Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari, at 4, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 857 (Dec. 15, 2010) (No. 10-779) [hereinafter “PhRMA Cert. Brief ”] (“For example, a pharmaceutical representative who specializes in diabetes

6
medicines may use prescriber-identifiable data to
identify those physicians in her region who write a
significant number of prescriptions for diabetes or
cardiology medications (and thus, likely to treat a
large number of diabetes patients).”); Brief of Respondents IMS Health Inc., On Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, at 3, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct.
857 (Dec. 16, 2010) (No. 10-779) [hereinafter “IMS
Cert. Brief ”] (similar). Data mining gives Respondents a clear view of exactly what happens in the
physician’s private office with particular patients by
tracking each patient with a “longitudinal” “linking
code” as the “fifth P” following individual patients,
JA158-60, 482-84. Data mining Respondent Verispan
boasted that “patient behavior can be directly influenced” using “actual prescription fills at the patient
level,” JA482, 484-86. Data mining subjects physicians to “various kinds of leverage,” IMS Health Inc.
v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 56 (1st Cir. 2008) (upholding
New Hampshire’s restrictions on the use of prescriber-identifiable data), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2864
(2009), including “the ability to target physicians
prescribing large quantities of generic drugs, the
ability to zero in on a physician’s customary prescribing choices, and the ability to punish physicians who
fail to display allegiance to particular brand-name
drugs.” Id. Section 17 directly addresses this issue.
“Without question, the law restricts the flow of otherwise private information about doctors’ prescribing
habits and the care they provide to their patients. No
party seriously disputes that.” IMS Health Inc. v.

7
Sorrell, 2010 WL 4723183, *29 (2d Cir. 2010) (Livingston, J. dissenting) (App.1a-67a).
Physicians have a legitimate interest in maintaining the confidentiality of information relating to
their medical practice. At trial, Dr. Grande testified
that “the privacy of patient welfare is likely to be
compromised,” JA327, JA326-28. Dr. Kesselheim
testified that removing data mining “will help prevent inappropriate use or over prescription of drugs
in patients” JA349-50. The Vermont Medical Association resolved that “the doctor-patient relationship
requires confidentiality and privacy to work effectively,” JA376. See also Pet. Brief, at 7-10, 46-51. This is
especially true “in an era of increasing and wellfounded concern about medical privacy,” Sorrell, 2010
WL 4723183, at *25 (Livingston, J. dissenting). While
Respondents found at least one physician who did not
expect privacy, JA280, Section 17 permits that physician to opt into data mining. The law only applies to
physicians who do have a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
Data mining also invades the privacy of Vermont
patients, supra, pp. 5-6, Pet. Brief, at 7-8. Prescription drug records are sensitive and consequential for
individuals. Patients have an “interest in the nondisclosure of private information and also their interest
in making important decisions independently.” Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977) (privacy concerns about
prescription drug records). In Whalen, the Court
found “no support . . . for an assumption that the
security provisions of the statute will be administered
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improperly.” Whalen, 429 U.S. at 601. In the present
case, the record is clear that Section 17 would extend
privacy protections to prescriber-identifiable data,
changing existing practices in the industry.
Respondents suggest that the prescription data in
question goes through a process of de-identification,
despite the presence of the longitudinal tracking
number. JA158-60, 482-84. Such processes may once
have been trustworthy, but advances in computer science have compromised extant security techniques,
“casting serious doubt on the power of anonymization”
and lesser de-identification technologies. Paul Ohm,
Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the
Surprising Failures of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L.
Rev. 1701, 1716 (2010). These problems are especially
acute in rural settings. In Vermont, “in small communities identifying a drug prescription can equal
the release of the individual’s diagnosis.” JA377. Data
mining exposes a patient’s prescription history, and
thus, their underlying medical conditions, to publication and exploitation, allowing companies to match
prescriptions with specific patients. JA158-60, 482-84.
This is a real concern, since
insurance giants have ready access to applicants’ prescription histories. These online reports, available in seconds from a pair of
little-known intermediary companies at a cost
of only about $15 per search, typically include
voluminous information going back five years
on dosage, refills, and possible medical conditions. The reports also provide a numerical

9
score predicting what a person may cost an
insurer in the future.
Chad Terhune, They Know What’s In Your Medicine
Cabinet, Business Week, July 23, 2008, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_31/
b4094000643943.htm. Nor is this an isolated problem. “Two-thirds of all health insurers are using
prescription data – not only to deny coverage to individuals and families but also to charge some customers higher premiums or exclude certain medical
conditions from policies . . . ”. Id.
Vermont also has a substantial interest in the
medical privacy of communities. Even absent specific
patient identification, the Respondents are able to
know the diagnoses and treatment plans for each
physician’s group of patients. PhRMA Cert. Brief, at 4
(identifying physicians who treat a large number of
diabetes patients); IMS Cert. Brief, at 3 (similar). A
recent article by Sharona Hoffman illuminates some
problems with pervasive use of health data in predictive analytics. Sharona Hoffman, Employing EHealth, 19 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 409 (2010). As
Hoffman notes, electronic health records can be fed
into “complex scoring algorithms” to “determine
which individuals are likely to be high-risk and highcost workers.” Id., at 422. It is not unrealistic for the
state to be concerned that insurers, employers, and
others will misuse the data to discriminate against
certain towns or regions.
Respondents use prescriber-identifiable data
without consent from either patient or physician,
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essentially forcing the doctor and their patients to
speak against their will. The First Amendment
requires no such thing. “The right to speak and the
right to refrain from speaking are complementary
components of the broader concept of ‘individual
freedom of mind.’ ” Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,
714 (1977) (citation omitted) (affirming the right to
refrain from speaking). Vermonters are exercising
“the right to be let alone,” untroubled by data miners,
echoing the sentiments of Justice Brandeis in his
dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928) (“the right to be let alone” is “the most
comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by
civilized men”).
A majority of this Court recently renewed attention in “a constitutional privacy ‘interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters.’ ” Nat’l Aeronautics
and Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 751
(2011) (citations omitted). Medical records are a
particularly apt subject for careful protection of
privacy and confidentiality, which in this case provides an appropriate constitutional counterweight to
First Amendment concerns.
B. The Prescription Confidentiality Law
Fits Within The Established Framework Of State and Federal Privacy
And Confidentiality Laws
In the larger context of privacy statutes regulating access to information, the Vermont law is

11
unremarkable. “In the United States legal landscape,
sensitive information is accorded special recognition
through a series of key privacy statutes . . . ” Helen
Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 Wash.
L. Rev. 119, 129 (2004) (listing statutory and common
law privacy protections). One example in the business
context includes laws protecting trade secrets. Neal
M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path:
Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 Geo. L.J.
123, 180-81 (2007) (“In many other contexts, such
as trade secrets and business confidences, American
law readily provides remedies against unwarranted
breaches of trust.”). In general, the American legal
system protects trade secrets from public disclosure
or private commercial use by others, absent consent
or independent creation, as long as the trade secret
owner takes reasonable means to protect the secret.
Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy
Advocates Can Learn from Trade Secret Law, 2006
Mich. St. L. Rev. 667, 698 (2006).
Respondents mischaracterize Section 17 as a ban
on publication akin to “prohibit[ing] the Wall Street
Journal from publishing stock prices.” IMS Cert.
Brief at 13. Interesting, but not relevant in the least
to this appeal. If a rival firm obtained data mining
files from one of the Respondents without consent
and published it in The Wall Street Journal or sold
it for commercial purposes, they would hear a
great deal about the reach and power of copyright
and trade secrecy law, despite the First Amendment.
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See e.g., Jerome Stevens Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Food
& Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(suing the FDA for posting trade secrets on its
website); In re Gabapentin Patent Litigation, 312
F.Supp.2d 653, 664 (D.N.J., 2004) (“The presence of
trade secrets or other confidential information weighs
against public access and, accordingly, documents containing such information may be protected from disclosure.”) (citations omitted). When weighed against
trade secrets, the “First Amendment typically does
not afford the press any greater right to information
than the general public.” Id. at 664, n.6, citing Nixon
v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609
(1978). See also Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Prior Restraints and Intellectual Property: The Clash Between
Intellectual Property and the First Amendment from
an Economic Perspective, 12 Fordham Intell. Prop.
Media & Ent. L.J. 1, 5 (2001) (“[T]rade secrets,
despite any expressive component, should be treated
as property that falls outside the domain of the
First Amendment. The very existence of a trade
secret depends on maintaining its secrecy.”). The
First Amendment is not a defense to data theft.
As a publisher, amicus THE NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE owns trademarks and obtains
copyrights to the articles they publish. If a rival firm
steals entire articles, the JOURNAL will appropriately
defend its intellectual property rights. The First
Amendment does not block enforcement of the Copyright Act. “The press, like others interested in
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publishing, may not publish copyrighted material
without obeying the copyright laws.” Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991), citing Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-79
(1977) (television station is not permitted to broadcast an entire performance without consent); see also
Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial
Speech Regulation, 58 S. Car. L. Rev. 737 (2007)
(describing tensions between commercial speech and
the Lanham Act).
The Respondents depend on these intellectual
property and trade secrecy laws every day, and would
not brook a First Amendment defense by an unauthorized user. See Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the First Amendment: The Dangers of First
Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1003,
1006, 1035-46 (2000) (critical of First Amendment
defenses against misappropriation of trade secrets).
Beyond the field of intellectual property, other
laws restricting access to information do not derogate
the First Amendment. “There are many federal
provisions that forbid individuals from disclosing
information they have lawfully obtained.” Boehner v.
McDermott, 484 F.3d 573, 578 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (listing
many such examples, including grand jurors, court
reporters, prosecutors, the Privacy Act, the Espionage
Act, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, tax
return information, state motor vehicle records,
Social Security Administration records, and attorneyclient privileges).
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Even our video store rental records are protected
from disclosure by federal law. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710. The law forbids
the knowing disclosure of “personally identifiable
information” concerning these rentals. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2710(b)(1). If any person tried to sell or disclose this
“personally identifiable information” without the
consumer’s consent or a statutory exception, they
would violate federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(d). No
doubt this information could be commercially or
politically valuable. This Court needs no reminder of
the political use of “personally identifiable” video
rental information. But that does not trigger First
Amendment protection for the person who obtained it
improperly or another downstream user or publisher
who was complicit. “A direct solicitation of unlawful
activity may of course be proscribed, whether or not
it is commercial in nature.” Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 579 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
Even newspapers are subject to these rules:
It is, therefore, beyond dispute that “[t]he
publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws.
He has no special privilege to invade the
rights and liberties of others.” Associated
Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S., at 132-133, 57
S. Ct., at 655-656. Accordingly, enforcement
of such general laws against the press is not
subject to stricter scrutiny than would be
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applied to enforcement against other persons
or organizations.
Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670. “The press may not with
impunity break and enter an office or dwelling to
gather news.” Id. at 669.
The larger framework of privacy statutes operates generally untroubled by First Amendment
concerns. As Judge Easterbrook said in Travis v.
Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 1998), “No one
thinks that the Privacy Act violates the first amendment. Well, maybe these plaintiffs do think this, but
the position is untenable.” (emphasis in the original).
Likewise, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia said: “Aguilar stands for the principle that
those who accept positions of trust involving a duty
not to disclose information they lawfully acquire
while performing their responsibilities have no First
Amendment right to disclose that information.”
Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d at 579 (referring to
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 605-06 (1995)).
Even in core First Amendment realms, privacy
interests remain important. The Sixth Circuit held
that a newspaper’s First Amendment rights must be
balanced against the financial privacy interests of
innocent third parties. In re Knoxville News-Sentinel
Co., 723 F.2d 470, 477 (6th Cir. 1983). The language
in that case is similar to Vermont’s declaration of a
“reasonable expectation” of privacy, 2007 Vt. Acts &
Resolves No. 80 (Act 80) § 1(29):
These individuals possessed a justifiable
expectation of privacy that their names and
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financial records not be revealed to the public. Their interests in privacy are sufficiently
compelling to justify non-disclosure. United
States v. Jenrette, supra, 653 F.2d at 620 (interest in avoiding injury to innocent third
parties properly weighed against broadcasters’ right of access); Application of Am.
Broadcasting Cos., 537 F.Supp. 1168, 1172-73
(D.D.C.1982); Application of KSTP Television, 504 F.Supp. 360, 363 (D. Minn. 1980).
In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d at 477.
One key error in the Court of Appeals below was the
failure to appreciate this difference between unauthorized access and subsequent publication. Publishers certainly have First Amendment rights, but
not if the data was taken without consent, violating
privacy, confidentiality, or intellectual property laws.
Judge Livingston’s dissent noted that Vermont carefully chose to protect confidentiality at a point in the
process well before publication. Sorrell, 2010 WL
473183 at *17-18 (“because that first restriction
prevents PI data from ever reaching the hands of
plaintiff-appellants, the principal question to be
resolved – and one the majority wholly overlooks –
is whether the restrictions on pharmacies implicates
the First Amendment interests of the data miners
and pharmaceutical companies before the Court.”)
(emphasis in original). As Judge Livingston further
noted:
Vermont’s law operates principally to prevent them from obtaining otherwise private
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PI data, and as such, does no more than restrict their unfettered access to information.
This the First Amendment permits. See
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17, 85 S.Ct. 1271,
14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965) (First Amendment
“does not carry with it the unrestrained right
to gather information”).
IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 2010 WL 473183 at *18
(Livingston, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Vermont protects private health information from
unjustified invasion with a number of current laws,
including the Vermont Patient Privilege Statute,
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1612; the Vermont Patient
Bill of Rights, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 1852(7); and
the Vermont Nursing Home Bill of Rights, Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 33, § 7301. These laws protect the privacy of
Vermont patients, giving them the freedom to keep
their medical records confidential if they so desire:
The patient has the right to expect that all
communications and records pertaining to
his or her care shall be treated as confidential. Only medical personnel, or individuals
under the supervision of medical personnel,
directly treating the patient, or those persons monitoring the quality of that treatment, or researching the effectiveness of that
treatment, shall have access to the patient’s
medical records. Others may have access to
those records only with the patient’s written
authorization.
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 1852(a)(7) (the Vermont Bill of
Rights for Hospital Patients). Nor is Vermont unique;
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similar medical privacy statutes are in force across
the country. Center on Medical Record Rights and
Privacy, Health Policy Institute, Georgetown University (2011), available at http://hpi.georgetown.edu/
privacy/records.html (listing medical privacy laws in
all 50 states plus the District of Columbia). Regulating the practice of medicine has long been a traditional state function under the police power.
Respondents do not bring a preemption challenge to the Prescription Confidentiality Law because
Congress has clearly protected medical privacy laws
like Section 17. The HIPAA statute explicitly saves
more stringent state privacy laws from preemption:
A regulation promulgated under paragraph
(1) shall not supersede a contrary provision
of State law, if the provision of State law imposes requirements, standards, or implementation specifications that are more stringent
than the requirements, standards, or implementation specifications imposed under the
regulation.
HIPAA § 264(c)(2). Vermont’s more stringent privacy
statutes are therefore expressly protected from
preemption by federal law.
Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, the federal
government has identified no fewer than 18 sensitive
data fields in medical records, and given these data
fields special legal status as “protected health information” or “PHI.” Id. Data fields such as the patient’s
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name, social security number, address, and zip code
(beyond the first three digits) are identified as PHI.
Id. Improper disclosure of PHI violates federal law.
Id. To our knowledge, no one has successfully brought
a First Amendment challenge to GINA or the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, but if Respondents have the constitutional right to commercialize prescriber-identifiable
data without consent, it is hard to discern a meaningful distinction that would prevent commercialization
of the medical data protected by GINA and HIPAA as
well.
The federal government takes these medical
privacy rights seriously. Indeed, just this year the
Office of Civil Rights in the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services imposed two multimillion dollar fines for violations of the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Mary Anne Pazanowski, HHS Breaks
New Ground With $43 Million Penalty for HIPAA
Privacy Rule Violation, 20 Health Law Reporter 277
(BNA) (Feb. 24, 2011) (penalizing Cignet Health of
Prince George’s County, Maryland, for “violating the
rights of 41 patients”); Resolution Agreement, February 14, 2011, available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/
privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/massgeneralra.pdf
(settlement in which Massachusetts General Hospital
agreed to pay a penalty of $1 million for accidentally
leaving protected health information for 192 patients
on a Boston subway train). Many other examples
could be described. See, e.g., Charles Ornstein, ExWorker Indicted in Celebrity Patient Leaks Former
Employee of UCLA Medical Center is Accused of
Selling Data to the Media, L.A. Times, April 30, 2008;
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Joyce E. Cutler, Kaiser Permanente Gets $187,000
Fine For Second Patient Privacy Violation, 18 Health
L. Rep. 974 (BNA) (July 2009). Pharmacies have also
been sanctioned for privacy violations. CVS Privacy
Practices Need Investigation Despite FTC Order,
Pharmacist Group Says, 18 Health L. Rep. 397 (BNA)
(March 2009) (noting the FTC Consent Order with
CVS Caremark Corp., one of the country’s largest
pharmacy chains).
Respondents’ arguments, if successful, will
destroy both federal and state medical privacy and
confidentiality laws, commercializing the most intimate details of our medical histories, in a mistaken
reliance upon the First Amendment.
C. Consent For Limited Purposes Does
Not Justify Commercial Data Mining
In a strange twist, Respondents argue that the
Vermont law doesn’t do enough to protect privacy, as
if they wished for a more comprehensive medical
privacy law. IMS Cert. Brief at 2 (“Information relating to pharmaceutical prescriptions has long been
widely distributed and used for numerous purposes.”). Respondents mistakenly imply that medical
privacy is somehow waived if the data is used for
other limited purposes. PhMRA Cert. Brief at 9
(“Section 17 expressly permits speech based on prescriber history information for purposes of ‘pharmacy
reimbursement; prescription drug formulary compliance; patient care management; utilization review by
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a health care professional, the patient’s health insurer, or the agent of either; or health care research’ ”).
The Court of Appeals made similar observations.
Sorrell, 2010 WL 4723183 at *5 (“The statute expressly permits the sale, transfer, or use of PI data for
multiple other purposes”). The Court of Appeals
treated these limited exceptions as if all physician
privacy rights had been extinguished. Sorrell, 2010
WL 4723183 at *9 (“Physician privacy might be
protected if the statute prohibited the collection and
aggregation of PI data for any purpose, or if the use of
such data were permitted in only rare and compelling
circumstances.”) The Court of Appeals goes on to say
“[t]he statute at issue here, however, does not forbid
the collection of PI data in the first instance.” Id.
This is entirely mistaken, as “the record supports
the conclusion that section 17 does not just reduce
but dramatically reduces the spread of PI data.”
Sorrell, 2010 WL 4723183, at *29 (Livingston, J.
dissenting). The plain text of the statute supports
Judge Livingston. In the Prescription Confidentiality
Law, Vermont articulated a “reasonable expectation”
of privacy in prescriber-identifiable data:
Health care professionals in Vermont who
write prescriptions for their patients have a
reasonable expectation that the information
in that prescription, including their own
identity and that of the patient, will not be
used for purposes other than the filling and
processing of the payment for that prescription. Prescribers and patients do not consent
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to the trade of that information to third parties, and no such trade should take place
without their consent.
2008 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 80, § 1(29). Vermont
was even more explicit in Section 1(31): “This act is
necessary to protect prescriber privacy by limiting
marketing to prescribers who choose to receive that
type of information,” Act 80, § 1(31). For many years,
the Vermont Bill of Rights for Hospital Patients has
promised that “all communications and records pertaining to his or her care shall be treated as confidential” except for permitted uses such as treatment and
insurance. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 1852(a)(7).
If the constitutionality of Section 17 hinges on
the alleged lack of clarity in Vermont’s statutes
concerning privacy, then let this Court say so plainly.
Vermont can then amend its laws to articulate additional statutory privacy rights and this litigation will
commence again. But the Vermont Legislature has
already spoken very clearly on this subject.
Of course, there are some important statutory
exceptions to health privacy and confidentiality,
primarily important government interests such as
public safety and prevention of crime. Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 18, § 4631(e)(5)-(6). In addition, protections can be
waived by written consent. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12,
§ 1612(a). Common reasons for granting consent
include medical treatment, insurance reimbursement,
and research. Anyone receiving health care in the

23
U.S. in recent years will be familiar with these privacy consent forms.
But these consent forms are limited to particular
purposes and do not otherwise destroy the private
and confidential nature of the information. Disclosure
might be permitted to the insurance company to
facilitate paying the bills, but the insurance company
cannot then publish the information on the Internet.
The waiver was for a limited purpose and the information remains confidential. When someone tries to
access PHI for another purpose, they suffer legal
consequences, see supra pp. 19-20 (detailing HIPAA
enforcement actions).
Pharmacies, health insurers and their intermediaries hold prescriber-identifiable medical records
for limited purposes and subject to a duty to maintain
confidentiality. These limited purposes include insurance reimbursement, filling prescriptions, scientific
research, and the other exceptions described in subsection (e) of the Prescription Confidentiality Law. Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4631(e). No one has given permission for this data to be used for any other purpose. If
a pharmacy sells this private health information to
the data mining Respondents, Vermont law has been
broken under the first sentence of § 4631(d). At that
point, drug companies have no right to purchase this
private health information and then hide behind the
First Amendment. Nor is state action evident here:
under Vermont law, the decision whether to share
this information with data mining companies rests in
the hands of the physician, not the state.
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The Vermont law is an integral part of a much
larger legal landscape supporting the privacy and
confidentiality of medical records. The Vermont law
operates under an express preemption waiver under
HIPAA, which explicitly permits states to enact more
stringent medical privacy laws. Vermont has done so,
with no more derogation to the First Amendment
than any other privacy, trade secrecy or intellectual
property law.
II.

THE SECOND CIRCUIT MISTAKENLY
TREATED THE PRESCRIPTION CONFIDENTIALITY LAW AS AN UNLAWFUL
RESTRICTION ON SPEECH
A. Vermont Does Not Ban Drug Advertising

Respondents mischaracterize this case as commercial speech, hoping for First Amendment protection for their activities. But Section 17 does not ban
advertising, which distinguishes this case from much
of this Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence. See
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360
(2002) (“We conclude, as did the courts below, that
§ 127(a)’s provisions regarding advertisement and
promotion amount to unconstitutional restrictions
on commercial speech, and we therefore affirm.”);
Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 562 (“the regulations prohibit advertising in a substantial portion of the
major metropolitan areas of Massachusetts.”); 44
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Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489
(1996) (“Our holding rests on the conclusion that such
an advertising ban is an abridgment of speech protected by the First Amendment. . . .”); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (“This case presents the
question whether a regulation of the Public Service
Commission of the State of New York violates the
First and Fourteenth Amendments because it completely bans promotional advertising by an electrical
utility.”); Va. State Board of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 752 (1976) (“It is
clear, nonetheless, that all advertising of such prices,
in the normal sense, is forbidden.”). For example, in
Lorillard, Massachusetts directly regulated the
placement of tobacco ads in stores. 533 U.S. at 562.
Section 17, by analogy, merely delegates to the storeowner the freedom to choose whether ads are appropriate. The heavy hand of the state is missing from
Section 17.
Respondents also rely on Edenfield v. Fane, 507
U.S. 761, 770 (1990), see PhRMA Cert. Brief at 16,
IMS Cert. Brief at 15, 22, but none of these cases
involves publication of improperly obtained private
information. In Edenfield, the statute at issue prohibited in-person solicitation by CPAs. If the Prescription
Confidentiality Law prohibited in-person detailing by
drug companies, then perhaps Edenfield would be
directly relevant, but the Vermont statute does nothing of the sort. The result in Edenfield would have
been quite different if that law had merely prohibited
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CPAs from using private, commercially valuable
information taken without the consent of the client.
For example, if a CPA tried to solicit new clients
using the potential client’s stolen credit card information, the First Amendment would stand aside
when the state moved to stop this behavior.
The advertising ban cases should not be applied
to overturn what is essentially a medical privacy law.
Section 17 gives physicians the freedom to decide
whether or not they will agree to share intimate
details concerning their medical practices and patients with commercial data miners. That private
decision is not a state-mandated ban on advertising.
B. The Vermont Law – As Amended – Does
Not Interfere With The “Marketplace
of Ideas”
Section 17’s influence on the “marketplace of
ideas” is not some heavy-handed pronouncement from
the nanny state that regulates speech for drug detailing. Section 17 fosters private ordering with precious
little state action. Physicians decide on their own
what medical privacy practices are best for their
patients. Section 17 simply gives physicians the
freedom to protect medical privacy and confidentiality
as they see fit.
The only provision of Vermont law challenged
today is Section 17. IMS Health Inc., 2010 WL
4723183 at *1. The original version of Section 17 also
included a quite different provision in former Section
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4631(f) that directly regulated the content of speech
by drug detailers when meeting with doctors and
required detailers to provide state-approved evidencebased information in those promotional meetings.
Section 17. In 2008, the Vermont Legislature repealed
this provision in its entirety. 2008 Vt. Acts & Resolves
No. 89, § 3. The provision originally read:
(f) When a pharmaceutical marketer engages in any form of prescription drug marketing directly to a physician or other person
authorized to prescribe prescription drugs as
provided for under this section, the marketer
shall disclose to the prescriber evidencebased information as provided for by rule describing the specific health benefits or risks
of using other pharmaceutical drugs, including drugs available over the counter; which
patients would gain from the health benefits
or be susceptible to the risks described; the
range of prescription drug treatment options;
and the cost of the treatment options. As
necessary, the office of Vermont health access, in consultation with the department of
health, the area centers on health education,
the office of professional regulation, and the
office of the attorney general, shall develop
rules for compliance with this subsection, including the certification of materials which
are evidence-based as defined in Section
4621 of this title and which conditions have
evidence-based treatment guidelines. The
rules shall be consistent with the federal
Food and Drug Administration’s regulations
regarding false and misleading advertising.
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To the extent practicable, the rules shall use
the evidence-based standards developed by
the blueprint for health.
2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 80, § 17(f) repealed by
2008 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 89, § 3. The Court of
Appeals failed to fully consider the implications of
this repeal. For example, much is made of Vermont’s
proclaimed intervention into the “marketplace of
ideas,” Act 80, § 1, and “ensuring prescribers receive
unbiased information,” Section 17. IMS Health Inc.,
2010 WL 4723183 at *4-5 (“The findings expressly
state the legislature’s intent to interfere with the
marketplace of ideas to promote the interests of the
state.”). The Court of Appeals went on at length:
The legislature expressed its concern that
the “marketplace for ideas on medicine safety and effectiveness is frequently one-sided,”
leading doctors to prescribe “drugs based on
incomplete and biased information.” Id. at
§ 1(4). The legislature therefore found that
“[p]ublic health is ill served by the massive
imbalance in information presented to doctors and other prescribers.” Id. at § 1(6). Section 17 is the state’s attempt to correct what
it sees as an unbalanced marketplace of ideas that undermines the state’s interests in
promoting public health, protecting prescriber privacy, and reducing health care costs.
IMS Health Inc., 2010 WL 4723183 at *5. Reliance on
these legislative findings in Act 80, §§ 1, 17 to support
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a First Amendment challenge is misguided at best, as
many of the findings relate to the now-repealed
version of Section 4631(f). And yet, Respondents cite
these irrelevant legislative findings incessantly, see
IMS Cert. Brief at 1, passim; PhRMA Cert. Brief at 1,
passim. The Respondents have made an interesting
hypothetical argument that former Section 4631(f)
might be unconstitutional, but that provision is not
part of Vermont’s law.
In addition, some of the other legislative findings
quoted by Respondents are not relevant for a different reason. Many of the legislative findings relate to
other provisions in Act 80 that Respondents have not
challenged, and yet they mix-and-match in an attempt to infer guilt by association. The unchallenged
sections of Act 80 include many provisions that address the allegedly biased nature of information in
drug sales and represent Vermont’s attempt to intervene in the market to reduce prescription drug prices.
See, e.g., the Pharmacy Best Practices and Cost
Control Program (establishing a program to “reduce
the cost of providing prescription drugs,” including an
“evidence-based preferred list of covered prescription
drugs that identifies preferred choices within therapeutic classes for particular diseases and conditions,
including generic alternatives and over-the-counter
drugs.”); revisions to Vermont’s Pharmaceutical
Marketing Disclosure Law; mandatory disclosure of
the actual price of prescription drugs dispensed in
Vermont; the creation of state pharmacy discount
plans; regulation of pharmacy benefit managers;
notice requirements for changes in preferred drug
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lists; a state supported evidence-based education
program; a generic drug voucher pilot project; expanding the use of lower priced prescription drugs
under the federal 340B program; an annual fee on
drug companies, used to fund the evidence-based
education programs described above; consumer
protections against drug advertisements that do not
comply with federal laws; and related insurance
marketing reforms, Act 80, §§ 3-9, 11, 14-16, 20-22.
Respondents should stop quoting legislative
findings in Act 80, § 1 that refer to unchallenged
legislation unless it references the specific language
in Section 17, as amended. Perhaps one day Respondents can argue that these other provisions in Act 80
are unconstitutional, but today is not that day.
C. Medical Privacy Is A Substantial State
Interest
With respect to privacy, the Court of Appeals
improperly conflated the first and second prongs of
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The first prong is
satisfied because medical privacy is undeniably a
substantial state interest. Supra §§ I.A. – B. In Trans
Union, financial privacy was found to be a substantial
state interest, Trans Union Corp. v. Fed. Trade
Comm’n, 245 F.3d 809, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Contrary to the company’s assertions, we have no doubt that
this interest – protecting the privacy of consumer
credit information – is substantial.”). The state interest in medical privacy is even more clear, given the
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sustained interest in medical privacy at the state and
federal levels, supra, §§ I.A. – B.
When Judge Koeltl dismissed the privacy argument as “speculative,” Sorrell, 2010 WL 4723183 at
*10, this is best understood as a claim that Vermont
has not proved the third prong – in this case, whether
Section 17 “directly advances the governmental
interest asserted,” Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
Hence, Judge Koeltl was actually operating under the
second prong when he wrote, “Vermont has not shown
any effect on the integrity of the prescribing process
or the trust patients have in their doctors from the
use of PI data in marketing.” Sorrell, 2010 WL
4723183 at *10.
The First Circuit found the goal of cost containment to be sufficient, and did not fully take up the
issue of privacy. Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 84. In the Maine
data mining case, the District Court held that “patient confidentiality is a substantial government
interest,” IMS Health Corp. v. Rowe, 532 F.Supp.2d
153, 170 (D. Me. 2008), but the Attorney General of
Maine did not extensively argue the Maine Legislature’s findings on prescriber privacy. Id. at 170-72.
Similarly, in this case, the trial court below reached
its decision on other grounds and did not fully consider privacy. As the District Court below said:
Because the Court accepts cost containent and protecting public health as subtantial government interests, it need not
consider the Attorney General’s assertion
that protecting prescriber privacy is also a
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substantial government interest. Cf. Ayotte,
550 F.3d at 55 (restricting analysis to cost
containment interest for “simplicity’s sake”);
Anderson, 294 F.3d at 461 (declining to
consider an asserted interest because the
regulatory scheme was sustainable based
on another interest).
IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 F.Supp.2d 434, 450
(D. Vt. 2009) (App.68a-118a). If this Court finds
Vermont’s privacy interests to be insufficiently articulated during litigation, we urge this Court to remand
this case back to the trial court to develop a full record on the privacy interests advanced by Section 17.
D. The Prescription Confidentiality Law
“Directly Advances” Substantial State
Interests
Vermont is entitled to protect privacy qua privacy, not as a means to whatever social ends Judge
Koeltl finds sufficiently meritorious. For example, the
Fair Credit Reporting Act easily survived a First
Amendment challenge in 2001, even though it flatly
prohibited the sharing of some types of data. Trans
Union, 245 F.3d at 818 (“Trans Union’s First Amendment challenge fares no better. Banning the sale of
target marketing lists, the company says, amounts
to a restriction on its speech subject to strict scrutiny. Again, Trans Union misunderstands our standard of review.”). The Trans Union court did not
require that the Fair Credit Reporting Act directly
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advance financial well-being, economic efficiency, or
some other judicially-selected goal. Directly advancing financial privacy was enough.
It should be enough that the Prescription Confidentiality Law was supported by an unanimous
resolution from the Vermont Medical Society: “the use
of physician prescription information by sales representatives is an intrusion into the way physicians
practice medicine.” JA376-78, at 378. This Resolution
also stated: “the doctor-patient relationship requires
confidentiality and privacy to work effectively.”
JA376. Just as the state helped create this hazard by
requiring the maintenance of prescriber records at
Vermont pharmacies, Pet. Br. at 3-5, JA253, it is
entitled to mitigate it by limiting the use of these
records.
Vermont’s law vindicates other longstanding
dimensions of health privacy. Rarely does a month go
by without a revelation of a data breach, see supra pp.
19-20. In a world where privacy is daily being eroded
by technological advances, Vermont may deem it
prudent to slow the dissemination of certain data in
order to avoid similar breaches. Federal law has
specifically permitted just such a move. HIPAA
§ 264(c)(2).
Vermont’s concerns about data mining are well
founded. The Respondents cannot plausibly deny that
visits from sales representatives armed with prescriber-identifiable data exert a powerful influence on
physicians’ prescribing practices. Indeed, that is the
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foundation of this multi-billion dollar business model.
App.71a; JA169; A-168. Before the First Circuit,
“[t]he plaintiffs did not deny that prescribing histories made detailing more efficacious.” Ayotte, 550 F.3d
at 56.
1. Data Mining Increases Costs
The medical literature confirms this pervasive
influence. Many peer-reviewed studies have demonstrated the substantial effect that detailing has on
physician prescribing practices. An extensive record
was developed at trial, JA145-46, 149, 156-58, 160-62,
164-65, 325-28, 366, 376, 469, 473, 481-83, 488-90,
494-95, 510, 525. In addition, the peer-reviewed
literature is extensive, see, e.g., Ray Moynihan, et al.,
Selling Sickness: The Pharmaceutical Industry and
Disease Mongering, 324 BMJ 886 (2002); Katia
Campo, et al., Physicians’ Decision Process for Drug
Prescription and the Impact of Pharmaceutical Marketing Mix Instruments, 22 Health Market. Quarterly
73 (2005); Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth Honka,
The Effects and Role of Direct-to-Physician Marketing
in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative Review, 5 Yale J. Health Policy, Law & Ethics 785
(2005); Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?,
283 JAMA 373 (2000); Nicole Lurie, et al., Pharmaceutical Representatives in Academic Medical Centers, 5 J. Gen. Internal Med. 240 (1990); Michael A.
Steinman, et al., Characteristics and Impact of Drug
Detailing for Gabapentin, 4 PLoS Med. 743 (2007);
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Eric G. Campbell, et al., A National Survey of Physician-Industry Relationships, 356 New Eng. J. Med.
1742 (2007). In short, detailing sells drugs. As the
District Court noted:
This is the strongest evidence of the important role of PI data in pharmaceutical detailing. Put simply, if PI data did not help
sell new drugs, pharmaceutical companies
would not buy it.
IMS Health Inc., 631 F.Supp.2d at 451.
2. Data Mining Promotes Unsafe Drugs
Data mining also raises safety issues. Off-label
promotion is a safety issue because the FDA has not
approved the drug as safe and effective for the unapproved “off-label” use. Data mining is used extensively in off-label promotion, resulting in many lawsuits
and enforcement actions against patent-based drug
companies. Aaron S. Kesselheim & David Studdert,
Whistleblower-Initiated Enforcement Actions Against
Health Care Fraud and Abuse in the United States,
1996 to 2005, 149 Annals Int. Med. 342 (2008);
Michelle M. Mello, et al., Shifting Terrain in the
Regulation of Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceuticals,
360 New Eng. J. Med. 1557,1562-63, Table 2 (2009).
Pfizer, a member company of Respondent PhRMA,
recently agreed to plead guilty to off-label promotion
of prescription drugs and pay a $2.3 billion fine.
Jonathan D. Rockoff & Brent Kendall, Pfizer to Plead
Guilty to Improper Marketing, Wall St. J., Sept. 3,
2009.
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Prescriber-identifiable medical records were used
to facilitate off-label promotion of gabapentin (Neurontin). C. Seth Landefeld & Michael A. Steinman,
The Neurontin Legacy – Marketing Through Misinformation, 360 New Eng. J. Med. 103 (2009). Significant budgets were allocated for detailing and
promotion to physicians who were high prescribers of
gabapentin. Michael A. Steinman, et al., Narrative
Review: The Promotion of Gabapentin: An Analysis of
Internal Industry Documents, 145 Annals Int. Med.
284, 287, Table 2 (2006). High prescribers are identified through data mining. Id., JA325, 481-82, 525.
Prescriber-identifiable medical records were used
to facilitate off-label promotion of Xyrem, a drug
approved for narcolepsy. The physician responsible
for the off-label promotion was recruited by a detailer
who “had noticed Gleason’s high prescription rate for
Xyrem in 2003 and hired him to give speeches and
visit other physicians to discuss off-label uses of the
drug.” Mello, et al., Shifting Terrain, at 1561.
Prescriber-identifiable medical records were also
used to promote rofecoxib (Vioxx). Data mining allowed Merck to target specific physicians for detailing
based on their prescription history. Litigation following the withdrawal of rofecoxib has revealed the
existence of elaborate sales training campaigns
conducted by Merck (a member of the PhRMA Respondent) to divert attention away from concerns
about the cardiac risk posed by the drug during these
detailer/physician meetings. See Aaron S. Kesselheim
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& Jerry Avorn, The Role of Litigation in Defining
Drug Risks, 297 JAMA 308 (2007).
Three additional examples of data mining-related
safety problems are nesiritide (Natrecor), Eric J.
Topol, Nesiritide – Not Verified, 353 New Eng. J. Med.
113 (2005), Aaron S. Kesselheim, et al., The Rise and
Fall of Natrecor for Congestive Heart Failure: Implications for Drug Policy, 25 Health Affairs 1095
(2006); ezetimibe (Zetia); and a combination of this
drug with simvastatin (simvastatin/ezetimibe or
Vytorin), Cynthia Jackevicius, et al., Use of Ezetimibe
in the United States and Canada, 358 New Eng. J.
Med. 1819 (2008).
3. Section 17 Gives Vermont Physicians The Freedom To Opt Out Of
Data Mining
It should be noted that Vermont physicians
cannot otherwise prevent the sale of their confidential information to data miners because they lack
privity with the pharmacies and data intermediaries
who sell the data. Sorrell, 2010 WL 4723183 at *17
(describing the creation of prescriber-identifiable data
“without the knowledge or permission of the doctor,
let alone the patient”) (Livingston, J., dissenting);
IMS Health, 631 F.Supp.2d at 456-57 (describing
the “three-step transaction” to create data mining);
JA253-54; see also, Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft,
Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54
Hastings L.J. 1227, 1260 (2003) (“Much of a person’s
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sensitive information is not exclusively in the hands
of that person – it is in the hands of various companies. Some are companies that a person does business
with, such as financial institutions and utility companies. But others are ones that gather data about
people without their knowledge and consent.”).
The alternative process offered by the American
Medical Association is unsatisfactory because only 5%
of Vermont physicians are members of the AMA.
JA402-03. Furthermore, the AMA process does not
forbid data mining, only the use of the AMA Physician Masterfile, for which the AMA earns millions in
royalty income from the data miners. The Prescription Project, Prescription Data Mining, at 3 (Nov. 19,
2009), available at http://www.prescriptionproject.org/
tools/initiatives_factsheets/files/0004.pdf (“The response of the American Medical Association (AMA) to
concerns about datamining has been weak. The AMA
plays a key role in enabling the data-mining industry
by selling its physician database to data-mining
companies. . . . Sale of Masterfile data brought the
AMA $44.5 million in 2005. Although the AMA initiated an option in 2006 to allow physicians to “opt out”
of this program, the process is cumbersome and few
physicians are aware of the option. Moreover, even
when a doctor “opts out,” the AMA continues to sell
that doctor’s personally identifiable prescribing
information. Pharmaceutical companies may still
use the information to target their marketing efforts,
as long as they pledge not to provide that individual
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prescriber’s data directly to salespeople. Furthermore, the collection of prescribing data and identities
through pharmacies is not affected by the AMA
policies.”).
Respondents suggest that doctors could just
forego detailing altogether, PhRMA Cert. Brief at 5,
but in the view of many physicians that solution
throws the baby out with the bathwater since a
meeting with detailers can bring some benefits to the
physician’s patients, including free samples for uninsured patients. JA411-12. “Many physicians thus
tolerate detailing visits in order to reap the harvest of
samples,” Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 46 (“The free samples,
however, are highly prized.”) The most narrowly
tailored and freedom-enhancing mechanism is to
permit the physician to choose a middle course,
detailing without data mining.
E. Vermont Left This Complex Medical
Decision In The Hands Of The Treating Physician
Amici have significant expertise in the evaluation of peer-reviewed medical evidence. While the
empirical evidence against data mining is significant, Vermont did not choose to ban it outright or
to directly regulate detailers’ speech. Instead, Vermont promoted freedom by giving physicians the
ability to evaluate the evidence themselves and then
choose whether or not to participate in data mining.
This promotes First Amendment values, favoring a
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distributed model of scientific evaluation over a
hierarchical decision-making structure.
Respondents attack Vermont’s legislative findings as being insufficiently voluminous, Brief of
Appellant PhRMA before the Second Circuit at 21-22,
while simultaneously offering their experts to say
that Vermont made a policy mistake. Respondents
presented much of this evidence to the Legislature in
hearings, and in many formal and informal meetings
with their lobbyists. No complaint has been lodged
concerning voting fraud or irregularity in legislative
procedure. Indeed, Respondents concede that the Prescription Confidentiality Law was legally approved by
both the House and Senate in Vermont and signed by
the Governor. Brief of Appellant PhRMA before the
Second Circuit at 22. At the end of the process, the
duly-elected representatives of Vermont disagreed
with the Respondents and created the Prescription
Confidentiality Law. Respondents ask this Court to
ignore the democratic process in Vermont, and take
Respondents’ side in many complex health policy
issues such as the efficacy of various prescription drug
cost saving measures, drug safety issues, and the wisdom of expanding privacy protections to prescriberidentifiable medical records. The Vermont law wisely
leaves these decisions in the hands of the doctor.
Furthermore, the cases cited in Respondents’
briefs generally relate to legislative determinations in
an area where the government doesn’t have particular expertise, such as alcohol, tobacco and pharmacy
advertising and solicitations by CPAs and in-home
real estate agents. Here, Vermont does not just have
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an opinion on data mining; they have years of direct
experience, with billions of dollars in health care costs
provided by and through the State. If Respondents
have winning policy arguments, let them make those
arguments to the people paying the bills and to the
physicians seeing patients. Apparently, they lost
those arguments, which sends them to this Court,
looking for a third or fourth bite of the apple.
Finally, unlike some cases where a court is forced
to evaluate scientific evidence, this Court is not
required to do so today. Leave these complex matters
of science and health policy in the hands of those best
suited to make the decision – the prescribing physicians who are able to discuss these issues with their
patients. Let the individual physician decide whether
data mining is detrimental or helpful. The First
Amendment does not require unconsented disclosure
of prescriber-identifiable medical records.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
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CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the Court of Appeals’
decision and direct entry of judgment for the Petitioner.
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